How does an agency, charity, or society depict “normal human
life” to serve their means? How are their means framed artistically and
otherwise in order to farcically project a sense of “fairness?” In a system
defined by externalities, a discussion of semiology and materiality can offer
several useful insights into these contingencies of “Otherness” – particularly when
comparing the feminist struggle for agency in crafting the female narrative, with
the degrading depictions of the 'disabled' in early United Way advertisements.
Our very conception of the agents in question, however, is thoroughly
complicated by such a comparison. In different societal contexts, agency is participatory
in different ways and but most often relies on the erasure of individual experience
in order to define normalcy for the in-group.
The liberalism denoted by the Classical Greek idea of “collective
agency” can at first be deceiving. Collectivism practiced in sharing economies
generally aims to create a system of fairness, but as Karlyn Campbell notes in
“Agency: Promiscuous and Protean,” this kind of agency, as practiced in ancient
Greek culture, is undiscriminating and inherently prone to change, thus
obfuscating the identities of the agents in question.
This particular case illustrates the reciprocal nature of
agency, as the agency of a Greek male citizen was contingent on slavery and the
subjugation of women – in order to serve the “common good.” Though it was the
‘accepted truths’ constructed by these men that oppressed women and slaves,
they too were bound to them, but with a false sense of nobility. Classical Greek agency defers to the “beliefs
that either constituted common sense or were accepted as true because of the …
‘excellences’… of those who demonstrated prowess,” as a unifying principle for
the agent. “An agent,” she writes, “literally was a representative of their
community,” rather than an independent actor. In this sense, collective agency
suggests a system of inequality where agency is not synonymous with power or
autonomy. Agency, for Greek subject-positions, came at the cost of
self-sacrifice. For the oppressive ruling citizen class, agency came at the
cost of “sacrificing” these classes of people. In either case, it is “communal
and participatory” (Campbell 3).
The aforementioned kind of noble “fairness” supposed by some
modern notions of collectivism applies far more the United Way in their
capitalistic drive for “charity” for the disabled. Barton argues that
disability reflects “a dynamic set of representations that are deeply embedded
in historical and cultural contexts.” Using the rise of United Way in the
1950’s, an era of post-war conformity, paranoia, and growing affluence (often
framed as an agent of the “common good”/goodwill) is more than appropriate to
this understanding, considering the amount of xenophobia, repression, and greed
that the post-war era saw.
The relationship between United Way’s depictions of the
disabled and biographical depictions of women share the reductive yet
“effective” tendency toward erasure seen in Dana Gage’s fictive rendering of
Sojourner Truth’s speech at the woman’s rights convention in Akron. Just as
Gage altered the Dutch dialect in Truth’s speech to a more southern, perhaps
marketable and stereotypical one, United Way reduces and erases the complex,
vast experiences of the disabled to a constructed subordination. In either
case, a constructed audience is at play (Ong 10). In order to create an
“identity” for the disabled or black abolitionist women, an audience must be assumed,
and the same goes for United Way advertisements. This is perhaps no better
illustrated than in an advertisement depicting the silhouette of a man, with
his face and identity obscured, and the caption “The toughest handicap for a
retarded child is that he becomes a retarded adult (Barton 179). This faceless,
silhouette is erasure in a physical sense, but goes a step further. The
advertisement capitalizes on the fears of the able-bodied that they too may
become disabled. Using the deeply-rooted cultural association of mental
disabilities with infantile dependency and difficulty, and positioning the
audience as subject to the breakdown of mental faculties associated with
infancy, the United Way ad stokes the fears of its constructed audience, based
on predisposed assumptions that are being reinforced. This does not entail a
total destruction of these vast, multitudinous experiences of the disabled, but
there is certainly a replacement. The creation of a sympathetic, generous,
fearful, able-bodied audience is not an “erasure” of whatever their own
predispositions and experiences might be, but it is essential to the erasure of
individuality in the disabled. The able-bodied audience’s conception of itself
and the disabled are interdependent. Their “normalcy” is based on the othering
of the disabled, and the “disabled-ness” of the disabled is contingent upon the
self-perception of the able-bodied audience, which is fed this script through
fear tactics and their own construction as an audience.
Barton, Ellen L. “Textual Practices of Erasure:
Representations of Disability and the Founding
of the United Way.” Embodied Rhetorics: Disability in Language and Culture. Ed. James C. Wilson and
Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois UP, 2001. 169-199
Barton, Ellen L. “Textual Practices of Erasure:
Representations of Disability and the Founding
of the United Way.” Embodied Rhetorics: Disability in Language and Culture. Ed. James C. Wilson and
Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois UP, 2001. 169-199
Ong, Walter J. “The Writer’s Audience Is Always a Fiction.” PMLA
90 (1975): 9-21.
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