Gender theory
spends so much time analyzing the complexities surrounding the male and the
female. Have you ever supposed that gender was more than just a simple binary,
that “man” and “woman” are not the only two entities that compose a gender? I’d
prompt you to think what other “genders” might exist. While we assume that by
standard definition, the sex of an individual is characterized by concrete
biological factors, for example, men and women’s differing sexual organs, while
gender is a concept more convoluted. Again, through an acknowledged consensus,
most would define the term gender by the characteristics that are assigned to a
male or a female, according to a culture or society. In essence, what one would
describe as masculine or feminine are adjectives involved in defining gender.
If we are to assume this definition of gender, I will ask you then to dote on
this question: what gender is a transvestite? Judith Butler would
certainly have a lot to say about it.
In this semester
of school alone, I have been fortunate enough to gain immense knowledge on
feminist theory. After synthesis, it seems a central dilemma that feminists are
attempting to confront is identity. To further complicate the concept of
identity, feminist theorists have, for the most part, separated themselves into
two arenas of argumentation. There are constructionists and there are
essentialists. In the simplest sense, constructionist feminists (say that 10
times fast) argue that gender is socially constructed, while essentialist
feminists argue that gender is purely and sexually biological.
Doubtlessly,
Judith Butler is a constructionist. In her essay “Gender Trouble”, Butler
focuses her claims on gender being “performative”. Gender is an action. Gender
is a persistent impersonation. Is she suggesting then that we are all only
impersonations of ourselves? The word impersonation sort-of gives you the sense
that you might be acting like someone you’re not, or that you are representing
yourself according to your characteristics… characteristics that may have been
assigned to you. Here’s where the drag queen comes in. If Butler supposes that
gender is merely what consolidates the impression of a “man” being a “man”, or
a “woman” being a “woman”, then certainly it is performative. A drag queen,
although a man biologically, has chosen to assume the characteristics of a
woman, and to act womanly. Transvestitism is directly representative of
the performative nature of gender. And by societal standards, if a biological
man desires to impersonate a woman, he is automatically outcast. Butler notes,
“the very notion of ‘the person’ is called into question by the cultural
emergence of those ‘incoherent’ or ‘discontinuous’ gendered beings who appear
to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural
intelligibility by which persons are defined” (7). One’s “identity” is
challenged when he or she does not conform to the cultural norms that have been
assigned to a certain gender. Obviously, Butler argues that identity should not
be determined by gender, and that gender should not be determined by society.
In fact, Butler believes that nobody is a gender from the start.
On another end
of the spectrum, essentialist feminist Helene Cixous makes arguments using her
body, literally. In her essay “The Laugh of the Medusa”, Cixous hopes to empower women with their own bodies, or their own selves. In
her eyes, a woman’s anatomy is her identity. It is not so much what a woman
“represents”, but more what a woman is. It
seems she believes that one’s identity is inscribed in your body. And just as
any feminist promoting the battle of women over men, Cixous provides the way in
which women must “win back their bodies”. A woman’s writing is her freedom. She
says herself, “woman must write herself: must write about women, and bring
women to writing” (875). A woman’s anatomy, a woman’s identity, and a woman’s
language are all intensely connected. So, for Cixous, writing one’s own
experiences is absolutely pertinent to representation.
(Works Cited)
Cixous, Helene, Keith Cohen, and Paula Cohen. "The Laugh of the Medusa." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1.4 (1976): 875-93. Web.
-Samantha Stamps
Hey Sam,
ReplyDeleteI think that you brought up an excellent question! We have spent a large amount of time discussing gender's roll in rhetoric, but in today's society gender has been questioned because like you said there are no longer two entities. I think though that people that belong to the transvestite gender would still fit into the "other" category just like women. Butler points out that women are unrepresentable because as of now they are being represented in rhetoric by men. The political system that has helped emancipate them is also the one defining them. I wrote about this in my post and how Butler defines it as a defeating process. I certainly agree with you and Butler, identity certainly should not be determined by your gender or by society. Butler tells us though that "the cannon of modern rhetorical theory is dramatically and almost exclusively male" (Butler 345). I want to extend this question to you how can we fix this? How do we change the way we look at gender in rhetoric? How do we give all genders proper representation? (So many questions, so little time)
- Cailyn
I liked your thoughts and sentiments about Butler's "Gender Roles" because I felt very passionate and strong about it. I agree on the part of your blog when you define the different aspects of gender and its functions. Then you ask if gender is a performative function in which I think it is because if boy are taught to be men and girls are taught to be women then we would in some way shape or form be performing an act of behavior and nature. Even though we have genders such as transgender, we still feel the need to make sure we identify ourselves with something to make sure we feel "comfortable". I feel as if we can have that identification of gender but we do not have to let it control us let it be our only form of identification. The way we act, talk walk and behave can also be a part of our identity.
ReplyDeleteSam,
ReplyDeleteDoesn’t it seem like our understanding of gender would be significantly more complete if we could just come at it as Miller comes at genre. The issue is the common misconception that gender and sex are both binary concepts. There is male and there is female. There is no room for anything else. You are one or the other. It is this sort of closed system of classification that Miller warns us about when discussing genres. By doing this, we leave out the possibility for one individual to transcend these titles. Perhaps someone identifies him or herself as neither female nor male. Perhaps he/she identifies as a little bit of both. What do we do with these individuals? There is no commonly accepted gender that applies. SO, by attempting to classify these individuals, as we often do, our understanding of them is drastically limited. By putting a title on them that only describes on facet of their being, we fail to understand them as an entire, complicated being. We favor classification over typification. If only we could treat humans as Miller treats texts, analyzing characteristics and identifying fluid types, formulating new types when an individual doesn’t fit those that already exists. In some circles, this is being done. But for us, as a society, to really ‘get’ gender and sex, this needs to be done more widely and more completely.
Morgan