Blog 6, Part 2 - Ridolfo and Rife's Dilemma

In “Rhetorical Velocity and Copyright” Ridolfo and Rife bring up some very relevant issues concerning copyright, ownership, appropriation, and what they refer to as rhetorical velocity. The article poses some important questions that we, as rhetoricians and young adults/students, should consider as we continue to create work and publish it in the digital domain.

The article focuses on a particular case study involving a college student named Maggie Ryan. Maggie was a student activist working with other student activists in an attempt to convince the president of Michigan State University to join the Worker’s Rights Consortium (224). As part of their efforts to gain more publicity, the students dyed the snow in a common area on the university grounds. During this protest, a photographer took a picture of Maggie participating in a snowball fight. After the protest, the university used and reused the image of Maggie on the university’s website and in advertising efforts (226). The university appropriated, remixed, and took Maggie’s image out of context without ever contacting her or asking for her permission (228).

By using this case study, I think Ridolfo and Rife are addressing a very real problem that is becoming more and more prevalent as the Internet expands and improves for our generation and generations to come. The Internet makes it possible to remix, copy-and-paste, and share files with incredible ease (229). The possibilities for remediation are endless. In Maggie’s case, her image was appropriated and reappropriated without her consent or her control. While not necessarily applicable for Maggie’s case, Ridolfo and Rife suggest rhetorical velocity as a means of possibly predicting and controlling the appropriation of one’s work or ethos. Rhetorical velocity is “a strategic concept of delivery in which a rhetor theorizes the possibilities for the recomposition of a text based on how s/he anticipates how the text might later be used” (229). This concept is something Ridolfo and Rife deem extremely important for groups and individuals to consider in the age of remix culture (230).

Another important issue in this article is what can and cannot be “owned”. In the case of Maggie Ryan, it was an image of her body that the university appropriated. A human body eludes ownership in the usual sense of the word (230). There is a definite gray area when it comes to what does and does not fall under copyright law and in the Creative Commons. Ridolfo and Rife think we must start thinking about copyright law in terms of what is possible instead of what isn’t to come to a more concrete conclusion and make situations such as Maggie’s not quite as vague (241).

These issues remind me a little bit of Miller’s “Genre as Social Action”. Miller references Alfred Schutz and his theory that our knowledge relies on typification. In other words, we know how to deal with certain situations because we have a common understanding of types that were socially created (Miller 157). I think what Ridolfo and Rife are calling for here is sort of a similar theory. If we could typify situations under copyright law there would be less wiggle room for organizations such as MSU to get away with appropriation without permission, as well as a concrete answer for whether of not Maggie owned the image of her body.

Overall, I think what is most important for the pair of scholars is that rhetorical theory studies today encompass more tangible examples and strategies to help rhetoricians, students, and creators deal with issues such as the Maggie case (241). If Maggie were to go to court, the judge would most likely lean in favor of the university. Does this mean Maggie should lose control over her own image? Ridolfo and Rife seem to think not. They call for action to be taken in an attempt to improve the study of today’s rhetorical theory, incorporating real, tangible examples and rhetorical velocity to predict the worst and how to predict/prevent/handle the situation before it happens (241).